Online Papers
A list of online papers without annotation. For more information, try the links or start with the main research page.
Articles
- Theoretical Terms without Analytic Truths. Philosophical Studies (forthcoming).
- Explanatory Autonomy and Explanatory Irreducibility
- No Understanding without Explanation
- Economic Approaches to Understanding Scientific Norms
- Stochastic Independence and Causal Connection
- Ceteris Paribus Hedges: Causal Voodoo That Works.
- The Explanatory Role of Irreducible Properties. Nous (forthcoming).
- Probability Out Of Determinism. In Probabilities in Physics, edited by Claus Beisbart and Stephan Hartmann, Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
- Reconsidering Authority: Scientific Expertise, Bounded Rationality, and Epistemic Backtracking. Oxford Studies in Epistemology, vol. 3.
- Objective Evidence and Absence. Philosophical Studies, 144, 2009.
- Comments on Woodward, Making Things Happen. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 77:171–192, 2008.
- What Is Empirical Testing?.
- The Other Kind of Confirmation.
- Physically Contingent Laws and Counterfactual Support. Philosophers' Imprint
- Why Represent Causal Relations? A. Gopnik and L. Schulz (eds.), Causal Learning: Psychology, Philosophy, Computation, Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Essay review of Woodward, Making Things Happen. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 74:233–249, 2007.
- Mackie Remixed. In J. Keim Campbell, M. O’Rourke, and H. S. Silverstein (eds.), Causation and Explanation, Topics in Contemporary Philosophy, vol. 4, MIT Press, 2007.
- The Role of the Matthew Effect in Science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 37, 159–170, 2006.
- How Are the Sciences of Complex Systems Possible? Philosophy of Science, 72:531–556, 2005.
- Reply to Fitelson and Waterman, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 56:913–918, 2005.
- The Causal and Unification Accounts of Explanation Unified – Causally. Noûs 38, 154–179, 2004.
- Why Explanations Lie: Idealization in Explanation
- Bayesian Confirmation Theory: Inductive Logic or Mere Inductive Framework? Synthese, 141:365–379. 2004.
- Against Lewis's New Theory of Causation. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84, 398–412, 2003.
- The Role of the Priority Rule in Science. Journal of Philosophy 100:2, 55–79, 2003.
- Further Properties of the Priority Rule
- The Myth of the Final Criterion
- The Bayesian Treatment of Auxiliary Hypotheses. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52, 515–537, 2001.
- Do Large Probabilities Explain Better? Philosophy of Science, 67, 366–90, 2000.
- The Explanatory Role of the Notion of Representation
- The Essentialist Aspect of Naive Theories. Cognition 74, 149–175, 2000.
- Inferring Probabilities From Symmetries. Noûs 32, 231–46, 1998.
- Objective Probability as a Guide to the World. Philosophical Studies 95, 243–75, 1999.
- A Closer Look at the 'New' Principle. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46, 545–561, 1995. (Proper form of the probability coordination principle.)