How We Get a Handle on Physical Probability
A probability coordination principle instructs us, under certain circumstances, to set our subjective probability for an event equal to the physical probability for the event. Following these instructions appears to be the principal source of our grasp of the significance of probabilistic claims about the world. I have written on two kinds of questions about probability coordination: the question as to the proper form of the probability coordination principle, and the question as to why we are justified in conforming to the principle.
Published Work
- Bayesian Confirmation Theory: Inductive Logic or Mere Inductive Framework? Synthese, 141:365–379. 2004. (Discusses the role of probability coordination in Bayesian inductive inference.)
- Objective Probabilities as a Guide to the World. Philosophical Studies 95, 243–75, 1999. (Justification of probability coordination.)
- A Closer Look at the 'New' Principle. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46, 545–561, 1995. (Proper form of the probability coordination principle.)