Curriculum Vitae
Books
Depth: An Account of Scientific Explanation. Harvard University Press, 2008.
Bigger than Chaos: Understanding Complexity through Probability. Harvard University Press, 2003.
Articles
The Explanatory Role of Irreducible Properties. Forthcoming, Noûs.
Probability Out Of Determinism.
Reconsidering Authority: Scientific Expertise, Bounded Rationality, and Epistemic Backtracking. Oxford Studies in Epistemology, vol. 3.
Objective Evidence and Absence. To appear in Philosophical Studies, 144, 2009.
Physically Contingent Laws and Counterfactual Support. Philosopher's Imprint, 8(8), 2008.
Why Represent Causal Relations? A. Gopnik and L. Schulz (eds.), Causal Learning: Psychology, Philosophy, Computation, Oxford University Press, 2007.
Mackie Remixed. In J. Keim Campbell, M. O’Rourke, and H. S. Silverstein (eds.), Causation and Explanation, Topics in Contemporary Philosophy, vol. 4, MIT Press, 2007.
The Role of the Matthew Effect in Science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 37, 159–170, 2006.
How Are the Sciences of Complex Systems Possible? Philosophy of Science, 72:531–556, 2005.
Bayesian Confirmation Theory: Inductive Logic or Mere Inductive Framework?. Synthese 141, 365–379. 2004.
The Causal and Unification Accounts of Explanation Unified – Causally. Noûs 38, 154–179, 2004.
Against Lewis's New Theory of Causation. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84, 398–412, 2003.
The Role of the Priority Rule in Science. Journal of Philosophy 100:2, 55–79, 2003.
The Bayesian Treatment of Auxiliary Hypotheses. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52, 515–537, 2001.
Do Large Probabilities Explain Better?. Philosophy of Science 67, 366–390, 2000.
The Essentialist Aspect of Naïve Theories. Cognition 74, 149–175, 2000.
Objective Probabilities as a Guide to the World. Philosophical Studies 95, 243–275, 1999.
Inferring Probabilities From Symmetries. Noûs 32, 231–246, 1998.
A Closer Look at the ‘New’ Principle. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46, 545–561, 1995.
Some of my work in logic is published in Krister Segerberg, Notes on conditional logic, in Studia Logica XLVIII, 2, 157–168, 1989. My results appear on pages 166–167.
Objections, Replies, Reviews
Remarks on Harman and Kulkarni, Reliable Reasoning. Abstracta, SI-3:27–41. 2009.
Review of Bertugulia and Vaio, Nonlinearity, Chaos and Complexity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 60:447–451. 2009.
Comments on Woodward, Making Things Happen. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, forthcoming.
Essay review of Woodward, Making Things Happen. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 74:233–249, 2007.
Reply to Fitelson and Waterman, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 56:913–918, 2005.
Review of Batterman, The Devil in the Details, Philosophy of Science 69, 654–657, 2002.
Only Causation Matters: Reply to Ahn et al.. Cognition 82, 71–76, 2001.
Quantum Mechanics and Frequentism: Reply to Ismael. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47, 575–577, 1996.
Expository Articles
For the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, second edition, D. M. Borchert (ed). Macmillan Reference USA, 2006:
- Bayesian approach to philosophy of science
- Chaos theory
- Probability and chance
- Scientific explanation
Probabilistic explanation. In L. Sklar (ed.), Handbook of Philosophy of Science. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Forthcoming.