

Curriculum Vitae

Michael Strevens

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Interests

AOS ◇ Philosophy of science, philosophy of mind
AOC ◇ Philosophy of physics, philosophy of biology

Employment

Professor of Philosophy, New York University, 2008 onward
Associate Professor of Philosophy, New York University, 2004–2008
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Stanford University, 1997–2004
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Iowa State University, 1996–1997

Education

PhD ◇ Philosophy ◇ Rutgers University, May 1996
MA ◇ Philosophy ◇ University of Auckland, May 1991
BA ◇ Mathematics ◇ University of Auckland, May 1988
BSc ◇ Computer Science ◇ University of Auckland, May 1986

Books

Depth: An Account of Scientific Explanation. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. 2009.

Bigger than Chaos: Understanding Complexity through Probability. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. 2003.

Articles

Probability out of determinism. In C. Beisbart and S. Hartmann (eds.), *Probabilities In Physics*. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Forthcoming.

The explanatory role of irreducible properties. *Noûs*. Forthcoming.

Reconsidering authority: Scientific expertise, bounded rationality, and epistemic backtracking. *Oxford Studies in Epistemology*, 3. Forthcoming.

Objective evidence and absence. *Philosophical Studies*, 143:91–100. 2009.

Physically contingent laws and counterfactual support. *Philosopher's Imprint*, 8(8). 2008.

Why represent causal relations? In A. Gopnik and L. Schulz (eds.), *Causal Learning: Psychology, Philosophy, Computation*. Oxford University Press, New York. 2007.

Mackie remixed. In J. K. Campbell, M. O'Rourke, and H. S. Silverstein (eds.), *Causation and Explanation*, volume 4 of *Topics in Contemporary Philosophy*. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 2007.

The role of the Matthew Effect in science. *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science*, 37:159–170. 2006.

How are the sciences of complex systems possible? *Philosophy of Science*, 72:531–556. 2005.

Bayesian confirmation theory: Inductive logic or mere inductive framework? *Synthese*, 141:365–379. 2004.

The causal and unification accounts of explanation unified – causally. *Noûs*, 38:154–176. 2004.

Against Lewis's new theory of causation. *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, 84:398–412. 2003.

The role of the priority rule in science. *Journal of Philosophy*, 100:55–79. 2003.

- The Bayesian treatment of auxiliary hypotheses. *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, 52:515–538. 2001.
- Do large probabilities explain better? *Philosophy of Science*, 67:366–390. 2000.
- The essentialist aspect of naive theories. *Cognition*, 74:149–175. 2000.
- Objective probabilities as a guide to the world. *Philosophical Studies*, 95:243–275. 1999.
- Inferring probabilities from symmetries. *Noûs*, 32:231–246. 1998.
- A closer look at the ‘New’ Principle. *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, 46:545–561. 1995.

Objections, Replies, Reviews

- Remarks on Harman and Kulkarni, *Reliable Reasoning*. *Abstracta*, SI-3:27–41. 2009.
- Review of Bertuglia and Vaio, *Nonlinearity, Chaos and Complexity*. *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, 60:447–451. 2009.
- Comments on Woodward, *Making Things Happen*. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 77:171–192. 2008.
- Essay review of Woodward, *Making Things Happen*. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 74:233–249. 2007.
- The Bayesian treatment of auxiliary hypotheses: Reply to Fitelson and Waterman. *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, 56:913–918. 2005.
- Review of Batterman, *The Devil in the Details*. *Philosophy of Science*, 69:654–657. 2002.
- Only causation matters: Reply to Ahn et al. *Cognition*, 82:71–76. 2001.
- Quantum mechanics and frequentism: Reply to Ismael. *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, 47:575–577. 1996.

Expository Articles

- Probabilistic explanation. In L. Sklar (ed.), *Handbook of Philosophy of Science*. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Forthcoming.

- Bayesian approach to philosophy of science. In D. M. Borchert (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, second edition. Macmillan Reference USA, Detroit. 2006.
- Chaos theory. In D. M. Borchert (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, second edition. Macmillan Reference USA, Detroit. 2006.
- Probability and chance. In D. M. Borchert (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, second edition. Macmillan Reference USA, Detroit. 2006.
- Scientific explanation. In D. M. Borchert (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, second edition. Macmillan Reference USA, Detroit. 2006.

Selected Work In Progress

- Ceteris paribus hedges: Causal voodoo that works.
- Fitness and the impact of variance on selection.
- What is empirical testing?
- The myth of depth: Toward a shallow theory of concepts.
- An argument against the unification account of explanation.

Invited Talks

- Philosophy departments: Bucknell University, University of Rochester, Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh, University of Missouri at Columbia, Washington University, University of Minnesota, Florida State University, University of Toronto, University of Auckland, University of Calgary, University of Pennsylvania, Irvine Logic and Philosophy of Science, Columbia Philosophy of Science Seminar, N.Y.U., Princeton University, Brown University, University of Washington (Seattle), Cornell University, U.C.S.D., Caltech, University of Arizona, University of Michigan, University of Utah, Stanford University, Iowa State University, C.U.N.Y. Graduate Center
- Psychology departments: Stanford University
- HPS and Science Studies: U.C.S.D., Stanford University

Conference Papers

- The special sciences are both autonomous and reducible. Understanding and the Aims of Science (Lorentz Workshop), June 2010.
- Secrecy and sharing in science: Resolving the tension. Collective Knowledge and Epistemic Trust, May 2010.
- Varieties of understanding. Pacific APA, April 2010.
- The special sciences are both autonomous and reducible. Pacific APA Society for the Metaphysics of Science, April 2010.
- Thinking mechanistically. McDonnell Mechanisms and Explanation Workshop, June 2009.
- Inferring probabilities from symmetries: The scientist as child. Probabilistic Models of Cognitive Development, May 2009.
- Why the statistical mechanical probabilities are neither necessary nor sufficient to explain the special sciences. Foundations of Statistical Mechanics, May 2009.
- The conditions for successful probabilistic theorizing: Independence. IHPST Workshop on Probability in Science, February 2009.
- Secrecy and sharing in science. Philosophy of Science Association, November 2008.
- Extracting understanding from the causal plenum. Cognitive Science Society, July 2008.
- Is the mind Bayesian? Society for Philosophy and Psychology, June 2008.
- Objective evidence and absence. Oberlin Colloquium in Philosophy, April 2008.
- Three myths about concepts. Concepts Workshop, University of Turku, October 2007.
- The big picture: Causation among the levels. Causation and Mechanisms, University of Maryland, May 2007.
- The explanatory role of idealization. University of Pittsburgh/Carnegie Mellon Graduate Student Conference, Keynote Speaker, March 2007.
- Ceteris paribus hedges and the role of causal hypotheses in science. Kenan Summa Seminar, UNC Chapel Hill, September 2006.
- The explanatory role of irreducible properties. University of Cincinnati Annual Colloquium, May 2006.

In praise of instance confirmation. APA Central Division Symposium, April 2006.

The explanatory role of irreducible properties. University of Calgary Explanation Workshop, March 2006.

Why think causally? Epistemology of Natural and Artificial Systems, CSULB, February 2006.

What are special science laws made of? Arizona Ontology Conference, January 2006.

The wrong problem: Relevance and irrelevance in Bayesian confirmation theory. Formal Epistemology Workshop, May 2004.

Causal inference and categorization. CASBS Workshop on Causation and Categorization, February 2004.

Mackie remastered. Northwest Inland Philosophy Conference, May 2003.

The myth of the final criterion. University of Oregon Conference on Psychological Essentialism, 2003.

Bayesian confirmation theory: Inductive logic or mere inductive framework? CSLI Language, Logic, and Computation Workshop, 2001.

A neoclassical account of artifact concepts. Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 1997.

Commentator: Pacific APA, April 2007; La Pietra Conference on Causation, June 2006; Online Philosophy Conference, May 2006.

Journal Refereeing

Editorial boards: *Cognition*, *Philosophy Compass*

Philosophy journals: *Philosophy of Science*, *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, *Mind*, *Philosophers' Imprint*, *Noûs*, *Philosophical Quarterly*, *Perspectives on Science*, *International Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, *Erkenntnis*, *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, *Synthese*, *Philosophical Studies*

Psychology journals: *Psychological Review*, *Cognitive Science*, *Memory and Cognition*, *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*

Grant proposals: National Science Foundation

Doctoral Dissertation

Bigger Than Chaos: The Probabilistic Structure Of Complex Systems

Committee ◇ David Albert (Columbia University), Barry Loewer (chair, Rutgers), Tim Maudlin (Rutgers), Vann McGee (Rutgers, now M.I.T.)

Last updated: March 2, 2010